From 38dc1156a68cc345c63f93eab12c48cb9493e28d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
Date: Thu, 16 Apr 2015 16:37:40 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] cookie: cookie parser out of boundary memory access
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The internal libcurl function called sanitize_cookie_path() that cleans
up the path element as given to it from a remote site or when read from
a file, did not properly validate the input. If given a path that
consisted of a single double-quote, libcurl would index a newly
allocated memory area with index -1 and assign a zero to it, thus
destroying heap memory it wasn't supposed to.
CVE-2015-3145
Bug: http://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_20150422C.html
Reported-by: Hanno Böck
Upstream-commit: b5f947b8ac0e282c61c75b69cd5b9d37dafc6959
Signed-off-by: Kamil Dudka <kdudka@redhat.com>
---
lib/cookie.c | 12 +++++++-----
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/lib/cookie.c b/lib/cookie.c
index 0b9c8d3..fbd2fe7 100644
--- a/lib/cookie.c
+++ b/lib/cookie.c
@@ -233,11 +233,14 @@ static char *sanitize_cookie_path(const char *cookie_path)
return NULL;
/* some stupid site sends path attribute with '"'. */
+ len = strlen(new_path);
if(new_path[0] == '\"') {
- memmove((void *)new_path, (const void *)(new_path + 1), strlen(new_path));
+ memmove((void *)new_path, (const void *)(new_path + 1), len);
+ len--;
}
- if(new_path[strlen(new_path) - 1] == '\"') {
- new_path[strlen(new_path) - 1] = 0x0;
+ if(len && (new_path[len - 1] == '\"')) {
+ new_path[len - 1] = 0x0;
+ len--;
}
/* RFC6265 5.2.4 The Path Attribute */
@@ -249,8 +252,7 @@ static char *sanitize_cookie_path(const char *cookie_path)
}
/* convert /hoge/ to /hoge */
- len = strlen(new_path);
- if(1 < len && new_path[len - 1] == '/') {
+ if(len && new_path[len - 1] == '/') {
new_path[len - 1] = 0x0;
}
--
2.3.5