Blob Blame History Raw
From d8b92b21b224126860978e4c604302f3c1e3bf75 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Roger Pau Monne <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Date: Wed, 13 Dec 2023 15:51:59 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] pci: fail device assignment if phantom functions cannot be
 assigned
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

The current behavior is that no error is reported if (some) phantom functions
fail to be assigned during device add or assignment, so the operation succeeds
even if some phantom functions are not correctly setup.

This can lead to devices possibly being successfully assigned to a domU while
some of the device phantom functions are still assigned to dom0.  Even when the
device is assigned domIO before being assigned to a domU phantom functions
might fail to be assigned to domIO, and also fail to be assigned to the domU,
leaving them assigned to dom0.

Since the device can generate requests using the IDs of those phantom
functions, given the scenario above a device in such state would be in control
of a domU, but still capable of generating transactions that use a context ID
targeting dom0 owned memory.

Modify device assign in order to attempt to deassign the device if phantom
functions failed to be assigned.

Note that device addition is not modified in the same way, as in that case the
device is assigned to a trusted domain, and hence partial assign can lead to
device malfunction but not a security issue.

This is XSA-449 / CVE-2023-46839

Fixes: 4e9950dc1bd2 ('IOMMU: add phantom function support')
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
---
 xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c b/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c
index 1439d1ef2b26..47c0eee7bdcc 100644
--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/pci.c
@@ -1488,11 +1488,10 @@ static int assign_device(struct domain *d, u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 devfn, u32 flag)
 
     pdev->fault.count = 0;
 
-    if ( (rc = iommu_call(hd->platform_ops, assign_device, d, devfn,
-                          pci_to_dev(pdev), flag)) )
-        goto done;
+    rc = iommu_call(hd->platform_ops, assign_device, d, devfn, pci_to_dev(pdev),
+                    flag);
 
-    for ( ; pdev->phantom_stride; rc = 0 )
+    while ( pdev->phantom_stride && !rc )
     {
         devfn += pdev->phantom_stride;
         if ( PCI_SLOT(devfn) != PCI_SLOT(pdev->devfn) )
@@ -1503,8 +1502,24 @@ static int assign_device(struct domain *d, u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 devfn, u32 flag)
 
  done:
     if ( rc )
-        printk(XENLOG_G_WARNING "%pd: assign (%pp) failed (%d)\n",
-               d, &PCI_SBDF(seg, bus, devfn), rc);
+    {
+        printk(XENLOG_G_WARNING "%pd: assign %s(%pp) failed (%d)\n",
+               d, devfn != pdev->devfn ? "phantom function " : "",
+               &PCI_SBDF(seg, bus, devfn), rc);
+
+        if ( devfn != pdev->devfn && deassign_device(d, seg, bus, pdev->devfn) )
+        {
+            /*
+             * Device with phantom functions that failed to both assign and
+             * rollback.  Mark the device as broken and crash the target domain,
+             * as the state of the functions at this point is unknown and Xen
+             * has no way to assert consistent context assignment among them.
+             */
+            pdev->broken = true;
+            if ( !is_hardware_domain(d) && d != dom_io )
+                domain_crash(d);
+        }
+    }
     /* The device is assigned to dom_io so mark it as quarantined */
     else if ( d == dom_io )
         pdev->quarantine = true;
-- 
2.43.0